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Curtailing the market for private prisons: schism or blip?
The reputation of the privately managed prison sector in the UK has taken a beating in
recent years. Does this spell the end for the ‘whole prison’ contracting era, asks Dr. Simon
Bastow.
For nearly 25 years, new prisons built in the UK have predominantly been procured through
‘design build finance and operate’ (DBFO) contracts with the private sector. So the opening earlier
this year of a new supersized prison to be financed and operated by the public sector – HMP
Berwyn in north Wales – puts the future of ‘whole prison’ contracting in doubt.
Should we see this as a fundamental break with past orthodoxy? Or is it just a blip in the
development of a mature and ever-growing market for privately-managed prisons?
The Figure below shows the trend towards a mature oligopolistic market that has formed an
important integrated part of the national system. Three firms – G4S, Serco, Sodexo – hold about
one third each of the market share, running 14 prisons between them, equivalent to around 18 per
cent of the total prison population.
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Up until recently, the British government has shown confidence in this role for the private sector.
The operation of Birmingham prison, one of the largest and strategically most important in the
national estate, was handed to G4S in 2011. And Serco and G4S each opened brand new prisons
in 2012.
But since 2012, reputation of the private sector has unravelled – and tested the patience of
ministers in the process. Central to this were damaging allegations that G4S and Serco had
fraudulently claimed payments for electronic tagging of offenders. But this also coincided with
high-profile failures in private prisons, not least the serious operational instability in the early years
of the Oakwood prison.
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) responded with a combination of punishment and retrenchment.
G4S and Serco were banned from bidding to operate any further prisons. G4S also lost the
contract for The Wolds prison that they had held since 1992, as the contract expired in 2013 and
was taken back into public sector management. MOJ also shelved plans in 2013 to ‘market test’
and transfer several prisons to private sector operation.
But the response seemed more than punishment alone. Underlying the subsequent decision to
keep Berwyn in the public sector was the belief that the public sector could now operate prisons
as cost-efficiently as their private sector competitors. A quarter of a century of learning from and
competing with them had finally closed the gap. Or so ministerial rhetoric had us believe.
Also the Berwyn model guarantees more than one third of its prison services will be commissioned
externally. This signals a move to a kind of ‘public sector core and commissioned periphery’
model, one that fits neatly with reforms in the probation system with regional Community
Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) providing commissioned services around a core public sector
National Probation Service. The CRCs incidentally were another set of contracts for which G4S
and Serco were not allowed to bid.
There are also questions about the sustainability of the more recent prison contracts in terms of
adequate staffing and resourcing. In recent years the pressure to procure low-cost prisons has
pushed bidders to offer up more services at stripped-down prices. If ‘governments get the
contracts they deserve’, why would we be surprised that MOJ’s emphasis on low-price contracting
11/07/2017 Curtailing the market for private prisons: schism or blip? | LSE Management
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/management/2017/05/01/curtailing-the-market-for-private-prisons-schism-or-blip/ 3/4
About Afroditi-Maria Koulaxi
Afroditi was the editor of the Management with Impact blog between
February - June 2017. In September, Afroditi is starting her PhD at LSE
to investigate the mediation of migration.
Mail | More Posts (16)
has contributed to serious breakdown of control in two of their most recently procured prisons,
Birmingham and Northumberland.
Firms’ interest in these ‘low price’ contracts has begun to wane too. In terms of reputation, there is
very little desire on the part of the firms to be associated with catastrophically failing prisons.
Believe it or not, firms and their directors want to be associated with high-performing prisons – not
failing ones. As contracts are squeezed and expectations increased in return for what is generally
seen as diminishing profitability, the risk-reward pay-off begins to look much less attractive for the
private sector.
Of course, this unravelling may just be a blip. We should not after all underestimate the resilience
of the market and the ability of firms to take their punishment, demonstrate sufficient humility, and
find ways to grow existing and new markets. Neither should we overlook the fact that although all
three incumbent firms have suffered high-profile failures in recent years, they all run high-
performing prisons as well.
It is also a fact that most of the contracts in place are not up for renewal until after 2023, and the
interim cost of cancelling them would be exorbitant. Incidentally, all of the early contracts that have
reached expiry have been transferred back to the public sector – the next contract to reach expiry
is Doncaster in 2019. So it may be business as usual for at least another couple of years.
Clearly the system has been through a period of punishment and retrenchment, but in the new
Berwyn model there are signs of a constructive and designed break from the past orthodoxy. The
‘whole prison’ contracting model may be creaking, but it has brought insights and understanding to
the public sector over the years. One would hope now that a new model of a strong and lean
public sector core, combined with an innovative, competitive, and integrated commissioned
periphery can push on towards more constructive and rehabilitative prisons.
Notes: 
The post  gives the views of its author, not the position of Management with Impact  or the London
School of Economics.
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